In this dissertation project, we describe and implement a practical system application based on a selective disclosure credential scheme, namely the Coconut credential scheme [1] . The specific application here is an electronic petition system with the distinctive added feature of unlinkability as well as anonymity: such that no information about the anonymous petition voter is linkable back to the individual. In other words, there is no data leaked about who voted in the petition, just that the users who did, were indeed eligible and authorized to vote. As for the implementation, the client-side is done using JavaScript so that the client can trustlessly compute the cryptographic constructions individually, whereas the server-side is done using Node.js, but can easily be replaced by a more sophisticated and secure structure such as a permissionless blockchain platform.
Introduction Motivation and Goal
With the recent increased interest and research in applied cryptography and privacy enhancing cryptographic techniques, there has been significant innovation, however with the implementations slightly lagging behind. After learning about these findings and techniques over the year, I decided to create a specific implementation which relied on a cryptographic approach, namely a selective disclosure credential system called Coconut [1] . Selective disclosure credentials [2] [3] allow issuance of a specific credential (having one or more attributes) to a user with the ability to unlinkably reveal or "show" said credential at a later instance, for purposes of authentication or authorization. The system provides the user the ability to also "show" specific attributes of that credential or a specific function of the attributes embedded in the credential; e.g. if the user has an attribute x representing their age, let's say x = 21, they can show that f (x) > 21 without revealing
x.
One of the benefits from this approach is that users can be authenticated based on a credential while still preserving their anonymity. In other words, the user can be authenticated but the credential cannot be linked back to the user. Specifically, this project covers the application of an electronic petition system build on top of the Coconut credential system. There are a number of electronic petition systems that are currently being developed, but none that proved to be really complete or ready to be used in practical, large scale conditions. There were some implementations that try to make e-petition systems more secure and anonymous through the use of blockchain systems [4] [5] [6] [7] however they were still missing the feature of unlinkability, which is how this system is more encompassing. The motivation behind needing this added feature is to help prevent petitions from being vulnerable to corruption or interference and help provide a fairer result for the participants. As seen with the situation and events happening in Barcelona, [8] such a censorship-resistant feature would definitely be useful when authorities "seize[d] ballot boxes" [9] ahead of the Catalan referendum. Hiding the metadata regarding who voted for whom would definitely be useful in such a scenario. The only data which would be leaked if at least one authority maliciously leaks it, is the data concerning who is eligible to vote, as opposed to who actually voted. This should not happen in the case where all authorities 6 are honest. Also, unlinkability makes the system more secure and private, even in the case that all voters collude to try and breach a voter's privacy (ie. perfect ballot secrecy). This is because even if the vote is breached, there is no information about who this specific vote belonged to in the first place.
Organization/Structure of the Review
This dissertation project revolves around the implementation of an e-petition scheme based on the Coconut selective credential disclosure system and an additive ElGamal homomorphic/threshold decryption system. We first go over a background of alternative methods for e-petition schemes as well as previous implementation of selective disclosure credential system, Tangerine [10] . Following that, we introduce a high-level overview of the coconut architecture and go over a few notations and assumptions. Next, we go through the Coconut system definitions and design coupled with an additive homomorphic encryption scheme for petition voting. Afterwards, we describe the system implementation of the e-petition in parallel with the system design proposed. The system implementation mainly consists of a fully functional prototype in Javascript mainly so that it is completely trustless and client/front-end is able to do their own cryptographic computations in the browser. The back end is done in node.js but can very simply be replaced by a more secure back-end such as a blockchain platform. Then, we go over some testing and evaluation of the system implementation. Finally, we conclude the report and touch upon future directions and work to be done.
7

Background and Related Work
Alternate E-Petition Implementations
Traditional paper-based, physical voting systems are clearly not scalable and inherently incorporate numerous centralized points of failure and limitations. For example, you must trust numerous entities in the system not to leak data about you, plus you must trust that the people in charge do not do anything malicious to interfere with the petition or even prevent or censor people from voting (as in Barcelona [9] ), etc. However, a transition to digital voting systems undoubtedly opens the doors to significant security vulnerabilities, risks, and limitations.
There have been many such applications in the past, however as of the time of writing, there have not been which confidently solve the critical issues of at least security and privacy. Some attempts, such as the Virginia WINVote machine in 2015 [11] , have even failed miserably and ended up being decommissioned as a result of the security assessment [12] done which embarrassingly highlighted all of the security flaws and vulnerabilities of the system.
Votebook [13] , a permission blockchain system for voting implemented by New York University, was an attempt to utilize the security of a blockchain system that resembles the current physical system with voting booths/stations and paper results that actually back the digital system on the blockchain. Their approach is a conservative one and favors a trade-off of security and integrity over privacy and censorship-resistance. Of course this is definitely legitimate approach in terms of security and reliability, however in some cases, such as with the Barcelona situation mentioned above, [8] privacy and censorshipresistance is crucial for the petition; especially when the police are "seiz[ing] ballot boxes" [9] and trying to influence and censor the petition itself.
There have been numerous other electronic voting and petition schemes/systems which are trying to leverage the blockchain security guarantees. However, as of the time of writing, to my knowledge, most feedback has been very skeptical with none of these systems actually confidently being used in practice. Even though some systems claim to have "the world's first secure open-source online voting software," [7] in my opinion, there are still many issues in terms of security, privacy, censorship, fairness and scalability which are yet to be solved.
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Some of the current projects could actually benefit from adding a private credential scheme like Coconut to provide unlinkability for the users/voters. For example, the Ethereum implementation of the Open Vote Network protocol [4] could benefit from adding an extra credential step at the beginning of the system. The Open Vote Network protocol is neat protocol where the tally of votes can be computed by anyone. Basically, this is done by having all voting parties compute emphemeral keys based on each others public keys and use that to cast their vote. Once they all cast their vote to the blockchain (which is used essentially as a public immutable bulletin board), anyone (even a mere observer) can just compute the tally of votes. This is done by multiplying all of the cast votes together and because of the way the ephemeral keys are computed, the encryption cancels out. Then, to get the actual tally number from that value (which is basically g v i where the v i 's are the different votes), the discrete logarithm must be done using an exhaustive search of possible outcomes (since the result is relatively small this can be done).
Tangerine Signature System Criticism
The Tangerine Signature System is a multi-authority selective disclosure credential system that was previously used to implement an electronic cash system done by a fellow UCL student, Jedrzej Stuczynski [10] . Even though the Tangerine system is similar to the Coconut credential system [1] , it exhibits two major flaws/limitations in terms of the anonymity and unlinkability security properties. The first of them, relating to anonymity, being the fact that there is no blinding of the secret value in the commitment. This is a vulnerability in terms of security as the secret can be compromised by and active adversary. Also, if two users request credentials on respectively the values m 1 and m 2 such that m 1 = m 2 , the issuing authorities learn that these two users requested credentials on the same attribute by simply observing C m 1 = g
= C m 2 ; this breaks blind issuance. This may not be such a critical problem in some cases (such as the e-petition) where the credential is a random value but in other cases where the credential is someone's age or name for example, it definitely is. To solve this problem, Coconut uses Pedersen commitments which are unconditionally hiding, as done in the PrepareBlindSign step of the Coconut implementation, namely replacing the commitment c m = g m 1 by a blinded commitment c m = g m 1 h o 1 .
The second vulnerability, concerning unlinkability, is the fact that in Tangerine's prepareForVerify step, matching showBlindSign or ProveCred of Coconut (depending on which version of the Coconut paper used), does not include any randomness in the creation of κ. This is fundamental in preserving the user's unlinkability against an active or even passive adversary. The attack is similar to the one against blindness where if two users have the same credentials on respectively the values m 1 and m 2 such that m 1 = m 2 , they would have the same κ m 1 = αβ m 1 = αβ m 2 = κ m 2 . The solution implemented in
Coconut is adding randomness to change κ from κ = αβ m to κ = αβ m g r 2 . However, in order to keep the bilinear pairing valid, another component ν = (h ) r had to be added, which doesn't pose any added non-negligible difficulties.
High-level overview of Coconut architecture
Coconut is "a selective disclosure credential system, supporting threshold credential issuance of public and private attributes, re-randomization of credentials to support multiple unlinkable revelations, and the ability to selectively disclose a subset of attributes" [1] .
The scheme is an extension of Pointcheval and Sander's work, [14] which is essentially a more efficient construction with the same properties of CL-signatures [2] . The main contribution of the Coconut scheme is that it introduces threshold issuance. Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen's private key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores)
(UUID, owner, vk,
options, scores) (3)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter holds the citizen's votes (initialized to zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold the public key of the third party creating the petition and of authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition, the users compute a value as follows.
Then, they add their vote to the options, append to a spent list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that is build from the same value x of their credentials:
Adding to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof ensures that has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2] . The bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code as an open-source project on GitHub. 3 . Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
2 ) of the execution of each procedure described in section section II. Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core Dell desktop computer, 3 and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also, aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient. Table II shows the communication complexity and the size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as presented in fig. 1 . The complexity is expressed as the number of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is 132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact that the proof s associated with the message is approximately 318 bytes; the proof v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above B. System evaluation Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client latency vs t -ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been 3 https://github.com/asonnino/coconut init vote 7 
smart contract
Ledger petition creator citizen
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen's private key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
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(scores, )
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2] . The bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using Number of measures: 10,000 Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation ( 2 ) of the execution of each procedure described in section section II. Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about 15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages, and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also, aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient. Table II shows the communication complexity and the size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as presented in fig. 1 . The complexity is expressed as the number of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is 132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact that the proof s associated with the message is approximately 318 bytes; the proof v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above to itself, and use these token to steal all the money in the buffer. The threshold property of Malet implies that the adversary needs to corrupt at least t authorities for this attack to happen. This property also prevents a single authority from taking the user money and disappear without issuing any token.
À Ã Õ OE oe --"
Privacy-preserving e-petition and evoting
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should remain anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This system is based on the Malet library contract and a simple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f points to a custom function requiring the users to prove in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authorities set q = 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen's private key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may involve checking some other information e.g. passport offband, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Successively, any third party creates an instance of the petition contract as shown in fig. 5 . The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)? how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options represented? holds the citizen's votes (initialized to zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO; and the fields owner and vk respectively hold th cation key of the third party creating the petition verification key of the authorities issuing the cre In order to sign a petition, the users compute a va follows:
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof that n is build from the same value k of their cre
The petition smart contract checks the proof p credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by v that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the check adds the votes of the users to the list of scores a nu to the list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen twice during the same campaign (prevent doubl ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been b a signed private key k; this means that the users c executed the callback to prove that they are citize
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides properties that enable the above application wh bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from the citizen's secret key and use it to sign on their behave. Also, it allows the users anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkabi blindness allows a system where citizens ha through the issuance phase only once, and re-use their credentials multiple time while anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issu moves a central authority and prevent a si thority from creating arbitrary credentials multiple time a petition.
Censorship-resistant distributi proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system b Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent ce when the target IP address has been blocked, b ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies become the target of censorship themselves. Fo ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklis entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a use Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen's private key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
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V. EVALUATION
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The signature scheme has been implemented in python using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2] . The bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code as an open-source project on GitHub. 3 . Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation ( 2 ) of the execution of each procedure described in section section II. Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core Dell desktop computer, 3 Signature on clear message:
Signature on hidden message: Table II shows the communication complexity and the size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as presented in fig. 1 . The complexity is expressed as the number of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is 132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact that the proof s associated with the message is approximately 318 bytes; the proof v is only 157 bytes.
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The signature scheme has been implemented in python using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2] . The bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code as an open-source project on GitHub. 3 . Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation ( 2) of the execution of each procedure described in section section II. Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This Signature on clear message:
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The signature scheme has been implemented in python using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2] . The bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using Number of measures: 10,000 Signature on clear message:
Signature on hidden message: Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation ( 2 ) of the execution of each procedure described in section section II. Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about 15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages, and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also, aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient. Table II shows the communication complexity and the size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as presented in fig. 1 . The complexity is expressed as the number of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is 132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact that the proof s associated with the message is approximately 318 bytes; the proof v is only 157 bytes.
Privacy-preserving e-petition and evoting
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f points to a custom function requiring the users to prove in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authorities set q = 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen's private key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may involve checking some other information e.g. passport offband, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Successively, any third party creates an instance of the petition contract as shown in fig. 5 . The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the ver cation key of the third party creating the petition and verification key of the authorities issuing the credenti In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n follows:
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof show that n is build from the same value k of their credenti
The petition smart contract checks the proof p and credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verify that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pas adds the votes of the users to the list of scores and a nu to the list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to v twice during the same campaign (prevent double spe ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built fr a signed private key k; this means that the users correc executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a se properties that enable the above application when co bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learn the citizen's secret key and use it to sign petit on their behave. Also, it allows the users to v anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citize vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability w blindness allows a system where citizens have to through the issuance phase only once, and can t re-use their credentials multiple time while stay anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance moves a central authority and prevent a single thority from creating arbitrary credentials to s multiple time a petition.
Censorship-resistant distribution proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censors when the target IP address has been blocked, but pr ies suffer from three limitations. Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen's private key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
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The signature scheme has been implemented in python using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2] . The bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code as an open-source project on GitHub. 3 . Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation ( 2) of the execution of each procedure described in section section II. Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also, aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient. Table II shows the communication complexity and the size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as presented in fig. 1 . The complexity is expressed as the number of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is 132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact that the proof s associated with the message is approximately 318 bytes; the proof v is only 157 bytes.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2] . The bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code as an open-source project on GitHub. 3 . Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation ( 2) of the execution of each procedure described in section section II. Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This Signature and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also, aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient. Table II shows the communication complexity and the size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as presented in fig. 1 . The complexity is expressed as the number of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is 132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact that the proof s associated with the message is approximately 318 bytes; the proof v is only 157 bytes.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been Similarly
In the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO; and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the public key of the third party creating the petition and of authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition, the users compute a value as follows.
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2] . The bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] Signature Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation ( 2 ) of the execution of each procedure described in section section II. Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about 15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages, and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also, aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient. Table II shows the communication complexity and the size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as presented in fig. 1 . The complexity is expressed as the number of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is 132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact that the proof s associated with the message is approximately 318 bytes; the proof v is only 157 bytes.
Privacy-preserving e-petition and evoting
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f points to a custom function requiring the users to prove in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authorities set q = 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen's private key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may involve checking some other information e.g. passport offband, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Successively, any third party creates an instance of the petition contract as shown in fig. 5 . The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verification key of the third party creating the petition and the verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as follows:
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing that n is build from the same value k of their credentials:
The petition smart contract checks the proof p and the credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it adds the votes of the users to the list of scores and adds nu to the list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote twice during the same campaign (prevent double spending). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of properties that enable the above application when combines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning the citizen's secret key and use it to sign petition on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens' vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with blindness allows a system where citizens have to go through the issuance phase only once, and can then re-use their credentials multiple time while staying anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance removes a central authority and prevent a single authority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign multiple time a petition.
Censorship-resistant distribution of proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship when the target IP address has been blocked, but proxies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to become the target of censorship themselves. For examshow Figure 1 : A high-level overview of the Coconut architecture, taken from Coconut paper [1] As illustrated in figure 1 above, in the 1 st step the user requests a credential from a set of authorities. In the 2 nd step, each authority issues the user with a partial credential which the user aggregates into a full credential (when they have a threshold number of shares) and randomizes in the 3 rd step. Finally, in the 4 th step, the user who owns the credentials can selectively disclose attributes or statements about them in a publicly verifiable protocol.
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The main objectives/design goals of this systems are to include threshold authorities, provide blind issuance and unlinkability, exhibit non-interactivity, liveness, and efficiency, using short credentials no matter the number of authorities or the number of attributes embedded in the credential.
Notations and Assumptions Zero Knowledge Proofs
As described in Coconut [1] , the system uses non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs to assert knowledge and relations over discrete logarithm values. The notation used to represent them is the one introduced by Camenisch et al [15] as shown below:
NIZK{(x, y, . . . ) : statements about x, y, . . . } Note that all zero knowledge proof used are based on standard sigma protocols to
show knowledge or representation of discrete algorithms. They are based on the DL assumption [15] and can be done without a trusted setup.
Security Settings
In addition, as detailed in Coconut [1] , the system requires groups (G 1 , G 2 , G T ) of prime order p with a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 2 → G T which satisfies the following properties:
bilinearity, non-degeneracy, efficiency, and we use type 3 pairings which rely on the XDH (External Diffie-Hellman) Assumption, which in turn implies the difficulty of the co-CDH (Computational co-Diffie-Hellman) problem as well as the DDH (Decisional DiffieHellman) problem. In addition, DDH is only guaranteed in G 1 and we would need to rely on the SXDH assumption (which is stronger) if we also want DDH in G 2 [16] .
Coconut System Design Scheme Definitions
The protocols that comprise the Coconut threshold credentials scheme are defined below as described in the Coconut paper [1] :
O Setup(1 λ ) → (params): defines the system parameters params with respect to the security parameter λ. These parameters are publicly available.
O KeyGen(params) → (sk, vk): run by the authorities to generate their secret key sk and verification key vk from the public params.
O AggKey(vk 1 , . . . , vk t ) → (vk): run by whoever wants to verify a credential to aggregate any subset of t verification keys vk i into a single consolidated verification key O VerifyCred(vk, Θ, φ ) → (true/f alse): run by whoever wants to verify a credential embeding a private attribute satisfying the statement φ , using the verification key vk and cryptographic material Θ generated by ProveCred.
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Coconut Credential Scheme (specific to e-petition) This scheme is briefly described in the the applications section of the Coconut paper [1] and can be seen as an extension of the work of Diaz et al [17] which does not consider threshold issuance of credentials. The below scheme is taken from the Coconut paper [1] however with slight modifications on the part of φ and φ to make it specific to the epetition.
It is important to clarify that the issuance of the credential happens only once, while the rest of the scheme can happen as many times as needed. The user must only randomize the credential and continue with the rest of the system scheme normally (basically starting at the ProveCred stage and continuing as usual every time the user wants to re-use the credential).
p is a λ-bit prime number. Let g 1 , h 1 be generators of G 1 , and g 2 a generator of G 2 . The system parameters are params = (
The Setup algorithm generates the public parameters. Credentials are elements of G 1 , while verification keys are elements of G 2 .
O TTPKeyGen(params, t, n) → (sk, vk): Pick two polynomials v, w of degree t − 1 with coefficients in F p , and set (x, y) = (v(0), w(0)). Issue to each authority i ∈ [1, . . . , n] a secret key sk i = (x i , y i ) = (v(i), w(i)), and publish their verification key
). In addition, TTPKeyGen can be distributed using techniques of Gennaro et al. [18] or Kate et al. [19] (as in the Coconut paper [1] ).
O IssueCred(m) → (σ): Credentials issuance is composed of three algorithms:
; pick a random o ∈ F p , compute the commitment c m and the group element h ∈ G 1 as follows:
Pick a random k ∈ F p and compute an El-Gamal encryption of m as below:
, where π s is defined by:
To keep an attribute m ∈ F p hidden from the authorities, the users use a blinding To blindly sign the attribute, each authority i verifies the proof π s , and uses the homomorphic properties of El-Gamal to generate an encryptionc of h x i +y i ·m as below:c
Note that every authority must operate on the same element h. Intuitively, generating h from h = H(c m ) is equivalent to computing h = gr 1 wherer ∈ F p is unknown by the users (as in Pointcheval and Sanders) And since h is deterministic, every party is able to derive it in isolation.
The users parseσ i = (h,c) andc = (ã,b); compute
Upon reception ofc, the users decrypt it using their El-Gamal private key d to recover the partial credentials
, where l is the Lagrange coefficient:
The users then aggregate any subset of t partial credentials. This algorithm uses the Lagrange basis polynomial l which allows to reconstruct the original v(0) and w(0) through polynomial interpolation;
However, this computation happens in the exponent-neither the authorities nor the users should know the values v(0) and w(0). One can easily verify the correctness of AggCred of t partial credentials σ i = (h i , s i ) as below.
Parse σ = (h, s) and vk = (g 2 , α, β). Pick at random r , r ∈ F 2 p ; set σ = (h , s ) = (h r , s r ); build κ = αβ m g r 2 , ν = (h ) r and ζ = g m s , where this identifier is generated through a hash function on the petition identifier
Before verification, the verifier collects and aggregates the verifications keys of the authorities-this process happens only once and ahead of time. First, the users randomize the credentials by picking a random r ∈ F p and computing σ = (h , s ) = (h r , s r ); then, they compute κ and ν from the attribute m, a blinding factor r ∈ F p and the aggregated verification key:
and ν = (h ) r Finally, they send Θ = (κ, ν, σ , π v ) and ζ to the verifier where π v is a zero-knowledge proof asserting the correctness of κ and ν; and that the private attribute m embedded into σ satisfies ζ = g m s . The proof π v also ensures that the users actually know m and that κ has been built using the correct verification keys and blinding factors.
O VerifyCred(vk, Θ, ζ) → (true/f alse): Parse Θ = (κ, ν, σ , π v ) and σ = (h , s ); verify π v using vk and ζ. Output true if the proof verifies, h = 1 and e(h , κ) = e(s ν, g 2 ); otherwise output f alse.
The pairing verification is similar to Pointcheval and Sanders [14] and Boneh et al [16] ; expressing h = gr 1 |r ∈ F p , the left-hand side of the pairing verification can be expanded as:
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(x+my+r)r and the right-hand side:
From where the correctness of VerifyCred follows.
The main difference between this specific e-petition Coconut credential scheme and the generic Coconut credential scheme described in the Coconut paper [1] , which can be found in the appendix Coconut Generic Scheme section, is that the φ parameter in
PrepareBlindSign is simply equal to 1 and can be ignored because it's not needed and φ (m) = 1 parameter in ProveCred and VerifyCred is implemented as ζ = g m s = H * (s) m which is specific to the e-petition and basically prevents users from voting multiple times (also known as the double spend problem). Everything else is essentially the same.
Signature Petition Scheme
The signature petition scheme implemented here is one consisting of an additive homomorphic encryption system along with a threshold decryption technique on the encrypted result.
Once the the user's credentials are verified, the user will be elligible to participate in the petition voting. To optimize, it is done in parallel with the ProveCred and VerifyCred protocols above. The vote output is sent along with the ProveCred output. At the authority's side, if the VerifyCred is valid (credential valid and there is no double spend attempt), then they continue with the rest of the vote procedure.
In this system, there are 3 types of parties, the voters/users, the decrypting authorities, and the petition entity (owner/creator). Note that these decrypting authorities are not necessarily the same as the signing authorities in the previous Coconut procedure. Technically for simplicity, authorities can perform both signing and decrypting functions but they do not neccessarily have to be merged at all. Firstly, the authorities generate their El-Gamal keypairs (d, γ = g d ) = (secret key: sk, verification key: vk), and publish their respective public verification keys.
The users then collect and aggregate the El-Gamal public keys of the the authorities.
For simplicity here, we use an n-out-of-n credentials system with regards to the multiple authorities.
In addition to this, the authorities must provide a NIZK proof of the secret corresponding to the public key. This is done mainly to prevent a malicious rogue public key attack [20] whereby the malicious actor eve broadcasts a fake public key they when the aggregated with the rest, produces a key that is actually the real public key of the malicious actor, as shown below:
Then, when aggregated with the rest of the public keys, the aggregated key will pro-duce the following:
The consequences of this attack are that the group's public key would then be in control of the attacker Eve. Authorities then provide a NIZK proof of knowledge of the secret key to the public key they publish to prevent this attack from occurring:
Once the users have the aggregated verification key, they El-Gamal encrypt their vote v with the aggregated verification key.
An important thing to note is that since the vote is encrypted and only viewable by the voter themselves, a problem arises being that a mallicous voter can encrypt an arbitrary vote to adversarily affect the outcome. To circumvent this, a zero-knowledge proof π p is added to ensure that the vote v is either 0 or 1, namely v(v − 1) = 0, such that:
(Exactly how this is done is detailed in the Scheme Implementation section below)
Note the following two points. First, this NIZK proof does not prevent blank votes (ie. 0-0 or 1-1). Second, that we also include the encryption of the vote inverse for clarity/simplicity reasons, so that we get a total of 1 votes and 0 votes when we decrypt even though the inverse of the vote can be derived from the vote as done with the Coconut implementation in Python [21] . Then the users send that to the petition entity
The user then sends all of this information, (enc(v i ), enc n ot(v i ), π p ) to the petition entity.
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The petition entity then homomorphically adds the encrypted votes by simply multiplying them together, N being the total number of voters.
Similarly, for enc not (v i ) we get:
After the petition has ended, to get the actual results from the total encyrpted result, the petition entity must send this total to the decrypting authorities who jointly decrypt the total with their secret key one by one:
(And similarly for totalnot(v))
Once the last decrypting authority has jointly decrypted, the result will look like this:
Then all the last decrypting authority has do to get actual result would be to calculate the discrete logarithm of h total . Discrete logarithm computations are usually very tough to do, however in this case it should not be too hard since we know that all values must be either 0 or 1 and we can compute h i for possible outcome values of i until h i = h total .
It works because in this case, total is a small enough value for this to be done.
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System Architecture and Implementation
Starting Points
Fork of JavaScript E-Cash Tangerine Implementation
For the implementation of this project, the starting point was to fork the repository [22] of a previous fellow UCL master's student, Jedrzej Stuczynski, who implemented a multi authority selective disclosure credential system for an e-cash scheme. His implementation was based on the Tangerine Signature System, which exhibited some shortcomings in terms of security and privacy when compared to Coconut, discussed in greater detail in the Tangerine Signature System Criticism section. Accordingly, his implementations included these flaws/limitations, and are addressed below.
The first step to beginning this project from the forked repository, was to remove unneeded aspects/components such as the extra coin credentials (value, TTL, ID). The next step was to fix these issues and limitations. Once I had done that, I could continue from that starting point to implement the rest of the system onward from the IssueCred step, since the rest of the design/implementation is different.
Criticism of Previous Implementation
Even though Jedrzej's implementation was on the most part very properly done, it still exhibited some flaws that are worth nothing but most importantly had to be dealt with.
First of all, the commitment to the secret credential did not include any blinding factor as mentioned above in the Tangerine Signature System Criticism section, which is detrimental to the security of the system. In addition, the implementation of the commitment was done in the group G 2 using the generator g 2 . This was changed to be done in the group G 1 using the generator g 1 . The system still worked with the computations/constructions in G 2 , however they incurred an unneeded extra cost/overhead. This extra cost/overhead includes the fact that the commitment, credentials, and encryptions are unnecessarily twice as large. Moreover, arithmetic operations (ie. point addition and scalar multiplication) are more expensive (twice as much) in G 2 . This is illustrated more in the Testing and Evaluation section.
Furthermore, the implementation did not include a zero-knowledge proof for the ElGamal secret key of the client, the random k used in this encryption, and for the blinding factor o, obviously because it was not even in the system design to begin with.
Scheme Architecture
The architecture consists of 3 different types of parties, the client/user, the signing authorities, and the petition owner/creator(s), as can be seen in figure 2 below. Note that the ledger is acts as a layer in between citizen/user and petition creator/owner communications. Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen's private key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
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The signature scheme has been implemented in python using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2] . The bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code as an open-source project on GitHub. 3 . Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation ( 2 ) of the execution of each procedure described in section section II. Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about 15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages, of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is 132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact that the proof s associated with the message is approximately 318 bytes; the proof v is only 157 bytes.
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The signature scheme has been implemented in python using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2] . The bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code as an open-source project on GitHub. 3 . Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation ( 2 ) of the execution of each procedure described in section section II. Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about 15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages, and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also, aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient. Table II shows the communication complexity and the size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as presented in fig. 1 . The complexity is expressed as the number of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is 132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact that the proof s associated with the message is approximately 318 bytes; the proof v is only 157 bytes.
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Alberto: discuss crypto related works Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been 3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen's private key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party create an instance of the petition contract as shown in 5. The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter holds the citizen's votes (initialized to zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO; and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the public key of the third party creating the petition and of authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition, the users compute a value as follows.
UUID
A. Primitives evaluation
Privacy-preserving e-petition and evoting
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f points to a custom function requiring the users to prove in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authorities set q = 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen's private key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may involve checking some other information e.g. passport offband, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Successively, any third party creates an instance of the petition contract as shown in fig. 5 . The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)? how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options represented? holds the citizen's votes (initialized to zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO; and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi cation key of the third party creating the petition and th verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n a follows:
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showin that n is build from the same value k of their credentials
The petition smart contract checks the proof p and th credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifyin that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, adds the votes of the users to the list of scores and add nu to the list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vot twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from a signed private key k; this means that the users correctl executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set o properties that enable the above application when com bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learnin the citizen's secret key and use it to sign petitio on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vot anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability wit blindness allows a system where citizens have to g through the issuance phase only once, and can the re-use their credentials multiple time while stayin anonymous.
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The signature scheme has been implemented in python using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2] . The bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code as an open-source project on GitHub. 3 . Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation ( 2 ) of the execution of each procedure described in section section II. Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about 15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages, and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also, aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient. Table II shows the communication complexity and the size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as presented in fig. 1 . The complexity is expressed as the number of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is 132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact that the proof s associated with the message is approximately 318 bytes; the proof v is only 157 bytes.
Privacy-preserving e-petition and evoting
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f points to a custom function requiring the users to prove in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authorities set q = 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen's private key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may involve checking some other information e.g. passport offband, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Successively, any third party creates an instance of the petition contract as shown in fig. 5 . The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)? how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options represented? holds the citizen's votes (initialized to zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO; and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the ve cation key of the third party creating the petition and verification key of the authorities issuing the credent In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n follows:
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The signature scheme has been implemented in python using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2] . The bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code as an open-source project on GitHub. 3 . Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation ( 2 ) of the execution of each procedure described in section section II. Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about 15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Signature and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also, aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient. Table II shows the communication complexity and the size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as presented in fig. 1 . The complexity is expressed as the number of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is 132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact that the proof s associated with the message is approximately 318 bytes; the proof v is only 157 bytes.
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Privacy-preserving e-petition and evoting
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f points to a custom function requiring the users to prove in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authorities set q = 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen's private key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may involve checking some other information e.g. passport offband, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Successively, any third party creates an instance of the petition contract as shown in fig. 5 . The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)? how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options represented? holds the citizen's votes (initialized to zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO; and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verification key of the third party creating the petition and the verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as follows:
Censorship-resistant distribution of proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship when the target IP address has been blocked, but proxies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to become the target of censorship themselves. For example a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the system. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen's private key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
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The signature scheme has been implemented in python using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2] . The bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code as an open-source project on GitHub. 3 . Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation ( 2 ) of the execution of each procedure described in section section II. Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about 15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages, Signature fig. 1 . The complexity is expressed as the number of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is 132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact that the proof s associated with the message is approximately 318 bytes; the proof v is only 157 bytes.
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A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2] . The bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation ( 2 ) of the execution of each procedure described in section section II. Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about 15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages, and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also, aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient. Table II shows the communication complexity and the size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as presented in fig. 1 . The complexity is expressed as the number of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is 132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact that the proof s associated with the message is approximately 318 bytes; the proof v is only 157 bytes.
Privacy-preserving e-petition and evoting
Censorship-resistant distribution of proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship when the target IP address has been blocked, but proxies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to become the target of censorship themselves. For example a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the system. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the 
Platforms/Languages
The main motivation behind using JavaScript for the system was so that the client is able to locally and trustlessly compute the necessary cryptographic constructs and operations without relying on any 3rd party to do them on their behalf. As well as to be able to have an appealing graphical user interface. To this end, JavaScript was the most suitable choice.
The client is implemented through a React web application (JavaScript) and the rest of the entities are implemented through Node.js servers simulations which can be re-
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placed by something more sophisticated such as a blockchain platform like ChainSpace (discussed further in Conclusions and Future Directions).
All components are written in the JavaScript implementation of the ECMAScript 2017, or ES8, standard in order to easily write, share, and reuse modules between the different entities of the system. Then at run-time transpiled to ECMAScript 5, or ES5, in order to accommodate for browser vendors which are slow to adopt these new language features.
Cryptography
Regarding the cryptography of the system, the Milagro Crypto JavaScript library [23] is used for both the client and the servers. Specific components used include the SHA256 hashing algorithm, finite field operations (BIG number types), elliptic curve point types (ECP and ECP2 types) and their corresponding operations/computations. The setting used is the Fp254BNb and Fp254n2BNb 256-bit Barreto-Naehrig curves [24] that the authors of the library implemented using methods presented by Aranha et al [25] . Last but not least, Milagro's implementation uses the Marsaglia and Zaman random number generator [26] , and it's security relies on the being seeded with an external source of entropy. In this case, we also use JavaScript's WebCryptoAPI [27] .
Communication
The system entities/parties communicate with each other through the Representational State Transfer (REST) architecture using GET and POST HTTP requests and responses.
One thing to note is that since the cryptographic objects exchanged between parties are transformed to an array of bytes when sent and then recomposed by the reciever. This is because, as well as requiring less bandwidth, the cryptographic objects are represented using the Milagro [23] library types, which have lengthy chains of dependencies, and would cause issues when attempting to call methods on them due to the effects of serialization and deserialization.
Scheme Implementation
The code has been released as open source software on GitHub [28] under the Apache 2.0 license.
Setup
When the setup is initialized, all parties generate their corresponding cryptographic keys/keypairs along the proper parameters defined above. Note that since the scheme we implement is and n-out-of-n (as opposed to threshold) for the sake of simplicity, we do not need the When clients click on the "Sign Credential" button shown below, the PrepareBlindSign algorithm runs as described in the system design and the output Λ is sent to each of the authorities. However the only added procedure is that the client's device public key is added to the input of the hash along with the commitment and is included in the zero-knowledge proof for obvious security reasons.
As shown below in figure 5 JSON object of 5 elements is sent: pk_cred_bytes, pk_client_bytes, enc_sk_bytes, requestSig, and proof. As explained above, components being sent are first When a signing authority gets the POST request from the client, they first check the validity of the signature. Then they check the validity of the zero-knowledge proof. If both of these conditions hold, then they sign the credential with their secret keys and send the partial encrypted credential back to the client. When the client gets the response from the signing authority, they decrypt it with their El-Gamal secret key.
AggCred
Following that, the aggregation of the partial signatures is done by the client in the browser.
ProveCred
Once the above steps are completed, the "Sign Credential" button turns into a "Randomize
Credential" button as shown below in figure 7. When the button is clicked, it becomes disabled and an input form is added to the DOM (Document Object Model) which lets the client vote "yes/for" or "no/against" for a specific petition by clicking either the thumbs up or the thumbs down buttons respectively. This is shown below in figure 8 They must also input the specific ID of the petition they would like to vote on. Note that this input petition ID is what is hashed and raised to power of the secret credential in order to create ζ, which prevents users from voting for the same petition more than once.
As shown in figure 9 , a JSON object of 5 elements is sent: MPCP, MPVP, peitionID, signature, and votes. As explained above components being sent are first transformed into an array of bytes. The MPCP (make-proof-credential-petition) is the output of the zero-knowledge proof π v . The MPVP (make-proof-vote-petition) is the output of the zero-knowledge proof π p . The peitionID is the Id of the specific petition. The signature is the client's randomized signature. Finally, the votes element is the combination of the encrypted vote and vote inverse.
When getting a success response from the petition owner/creator entity, the button will show which petition you voted for, thumbs up or down, and the "Randomize Credential"
button will turn back on as shown in figure 10 below.
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Figure 8: Client inputs the petition ID and votes "yes" or "no" If the client clicks on the "Check Result" button, the client will query the petition owner for the result of said petition. In the case of the screenshot below, the petition owner replied that the petition had not yet ended. Also, if the client tried to vote for the same petition, the petition owner will know from the repeated value of ζ and prevent them from voting for the same petition. This is shown in figure 11 below. Note that if the client tries changing the value of ζ then the proof of knowledge (MPCP) will become invalid and also prevent them from voting. Once the petition ends, the petition owner adds all of the votes together homomorphically and then sends it to one of the decrypting authorities. The authorities will decrypt the total with their El-Gamal secret key and forward it to the next decrypting authority until the last authority is reached. Once the total reaches the final authority, they decrypt it and retrieve the log to get the actual values of the total votes ("yes/for") and total vote inverses ("no/against"). Finally they send that back to the petition owner who will get the final results of the specific petition to give to the clients when queried for the result. The client then simply displays the result of the petition in the form "yes" total -"no" total. The result is displayed in green if the petition passes, and in red if the petition fails as shown in figure 12 below.
A very important thing to note here is that this process described is sub-optimal in terms of security and verifiability since the clients would have to trust the signing authorities and the petition owner. It was only done this way for this prototype implementation for the sake of simplicity. An improved alternative would have for example the client get the total encrypted votes and then query each decrypting authority one by one themselves and do the log computation themselves. Another more elegant alternative would be to 
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Testing and Evaluation
The testing of the system was focused on breaking down the system into smaller parts for unit testing of specific functions of the system. The unit tests relied on the Mocha [29] JavaScript test framework as well as the Chai[30] assertion framework that can be paired with any testing framework. The unit tests were done to guarantee correctness of mainly the cryptographic constructions and operations without the overhead of the rest of the system and communications. Note that testing for the client and the servers was the same as they both relied on the same modules for the cryptographic constructions and operations.
Performance was measured according to some of the tests created for functionality.
As in the Tangerine system [10] evaluation, each of the system entities were deployed on fresh 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04 distributions on individual Amazon Web Service EC2 virtual server micro instances one a device with the following specifications: single core Intel(R)
Xeon(R) E5-2676 v3 @ 2.40GHz [31] . Figure 13 shows the results of expected execution time µ and the corresponding standard deviation √ σ 2 (in ms) of the main cryptographic operations and constructs used in the system. Naturally, the bilinear pairing operation is the most expensive of the cryptographic operations and constructs, which is the one used for verification. Also, operations in G 2 30 are twice as expensive as operations in G 1 as expected since the constructs are twice as large. This is why it is important to optimize the system implementation and use the proper fields where necessary in order not to incur extra unneeded costs, even though in theory everything could have been done in G 2 .
Even though communication overhead and latency are somewhat negligible in this system and on the order of single/couple kiloByte(s) in size and less than 1 millisecond in delay, they can be optimized further as mentioned in the Tangerine paper [10] .
Firstly, the number of authorities present in the system have little to no effect on the client latency as messages are sent simultaneously to all of the authorities in an asynchronous manner. Furthermore, as shown in the Tangerine implementation [10] , increasing the number of clients in the system greatly impacts the performance of the system and the perceived delay on the side of the client. This stems from the fact that Node.js is not optimal for heavy computation operations as it is single threaded with an event loop designed for asynchronous, event-driven tasks. However, this is not too much of a concern in this system as functionality and completeness is much more important than latency for an e-petition. In addition, the future goal is to replace the back end of the system with a blockchain based one (as explained in the Conclusions and Future Directions section), which will definitely introduce new bottlenecks in the system.
31
Conclusions and Future Directions
This project entails the implementation of the specific application of an e-petition based on the Coconut selective credential disclosure scheme. The main distinctive aspect of this approach is the added feature of unlinkability in addition to anonymity: such that no information about the anonymous petition voter is linkable back to the individual. In other words, the only data which would be leaked if at least one authority maliciously leaks it, is the data concerning who is eligible to vote, as opposed to who actually voted. This should not happen in the case where all authorities are honest. This censorship resistant property is very useful and sometimes even vital as is the case with the Barcelona referendum [8] .
Signature Petition Scheme
The signature petition scheme described and implemented in this project is not the most optimal one possible. The way it is done in this project is mainly for simplicity and clarity purposes especially since the main focus was on the Coconut credential system. It can easily be modified or even replaced by a more sophisticated/complex or simplified system based on the specific need.
Coconut Credential Scheme Template
During the implementation, it was evident that the Coconut credential scheme could be used for numerous different applications, so the implementation bas branched at the stage where the general Coconut system was ready in order to be used as an open source template.
Blockchain Based System
The plan from the start was definitely to implement the system on top of a public, permissionless blockchain platform in order to benefit from its security, immutability, and transparency. Instead of sending information directly to/from the different entities, the blockchain would basically act as an intermediary where the sender publishes what they want to send on the blockchain while the receiver waits until this is done and gets the information off of the blockchain itself. In other words, the blockchain would act as a 32 public bulletin board in which the different parties post whatever they would like to send on to it and the receiving parties get the information directly from the bulletin board. The receiving party would have to keep monitoring the blockchain to check for anything sent to them though, or for efficiency, the sender could notify them to check the blockchain whenever they publish something for example. This is especially valuable in the voting scheme used for the system because it would eliminate the need to trust the authorities and the procedure would be transparent and auditable by everyone.
The goal at first was to set up the system to work on top of the permissionless Chainspace [32] blockchain because it is perfectly suitable for privacy-preserving applications such as this one. However, unfortunately the Chainspace system is not ready yet at the time of writing. As for Ethereum [33] , the Coconut credential system used here can actually be used as an add on to the Open Vote Network [4] (or any other Ethereum based voting system) in order to add the feature of unlinkability to the system.
Hardware Wallet/Device Integration
Another future direction which could be a very interesting project would be to integrate hardware wallet/device (such as a Trezor [34] or Ledger [35] ) functionality in order to greatly increase security. The users would have to get issued their signed credential from the authorities on to the hardware wallet/device once at the beginning, to then be able to randomize and use it numerous times in the future. In the case of the e-petition, the user would have to go to the authorities in charge of the petition (government body, university authorities, etc.) to get issued a signed credential from them. Then, whenever they would like to vote for a petition anonymously/unlinkably, they would need to use their hardware wallet/device (which stores their private credential) to create the necessary cryptographic constructs and zero-knowledge proofs in a more secure manner than previously done.
